By Gabriel G. Tabarani
Next
year, the Egyptian revolution will mark its sixtieth anniversary. We are of
course referring to the coup d’etat led by Gamal Abdel Nasser on July 23rd,
1952 – whereby his Free Officer movement overthrew and expelled King Farouk.
They subsequently established their republic to spearhead and finally deliver a
long-held ambition: the creation of the "Arab Ummah" (Arab Nation), a
single nation pan-Arab and united nation stretching "from the Gulf to the
Ocean". This ideal of pan-Arabism, up to this point, had to endure
marginalisation at the hands of the era’s Real Politik.
These
dreamers came and went and were succeeded by Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak –
ruling for eleven and thirty years, respectively. Mubarak having recently been
ousted following an unprecedented uprising, started in al-Tahrir square, whose
shock-waves continue to be felt across the Arab world up to now.
Following
Nasser’s ideologically optimistic rule, the Sadat regime was defined by the
establishment of a cadre of “fat cats” who gorged themselves on their nation’s
wealth and the trappings of power. This system was replicated and refined
further under the Mubarak regime, Mubarak having been Sadat’s vice-president
and thus well versed on the abuse of authority for personal gain. The result:
galloping population growth, rising illiteracy and increasing unemployment –
all unwavering in their consistency.
Today,
three-and-a-half months after the fall of the last of the modern-pharaohs,
Egypt is still rife with uncertainty. Following the hedonism of revolution the
mood is currently very sobering. Queries now focus on national identity; this
is of vital importance to Egypt given its history as one of the great ancient
civilizations, its role as a major regional political and military power and
its current responsibility as a mirror to the broader Arab psyche.
Whilst
Egypt asks itself these soulful questions, as well as coming up with an
institutional frames upon which to establish them, the baltaguiya (loosely
translated as vagabonds,thugs or thieves) of the Mubarak regime remain. All the
while the Muslim Brotherhood has begun to emerge from the underground where it
has hidden for nearly six decades. Furthermore and consequently, there are
rising sectarian tensions; as demonstrated by the May 7thImbabaevents between
Muslims and Coptic Christians – the two largest elements of Egypt’s religious
jigsaw.
The
above tensions are overlaid with the machinations of the latest demonstrations
in Cairo’s al-Tahrir square (as well as other major cities across the country).
These reflect the anxiety and uncertainty amongst the core-elements of the
popular movement that led January’s revolution. Liberals, leftists and moderate
activists feel that – thus far – the protests that ousted President Hosni
Mubarak have yet to achieve much: their demands are as yet almost entirely
unfulfilled.
Aspirations
to make Egypt a prosperous democracy are fading due to the inefficiency of the
current, military led, interim administration. Despite its role in allowing the
recent revolution to take place, the military is still tainted somewhat by
association to the Mubarak era. The interim administration has to deal with,
not only, traditional parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood but also more
unpredictable elements such as comical old opposition groups, business
interests that flourished under Mubarak and of course good old-fashioned tribal
alliances.
Despite
these inherent challenges, Egyptians across the board are working out how to
square their unique circle to ensure that diversity,tolerance, stability as
well as progress and national identityare established and fostered. One hopes
that, given the era of “strongmen” has passed its norms will soon too become
history, replaced instead with a robust formula to allow the desires of Egypt’s
modern revolutionaries to be fulfilled.
These
challenges cause immense strain on the Egyptian psyche, like the cracking the
seams of the corset too long imposed on the people. Egyptian society is very
much faith based - and whilst Muslims and Copts still strive to present an
image of a nation united by the slogans of its revolution – it is still a
heavily fractured society. As sectarian as Bahrain or Syria, as tribal as Libya
or Yemen and as religious divided as Sudan where Muslims and Christians are
perpetually at each other’s throats. In all these comparative countries we see
the spectre of a disastrous enterprise in “democratization” initiated by George
W. Bush.
Support
for Hezbollah in Egypt is low; one could even say that the group is unpopular.
However, the Muslim Brotherhood has learnt valuable lessons from the
Lebanese-paramilitary force in winning hearts and minds. In an article
published by the New York times the new role assumed by the Muslim Brotherhood
is discussed with a villager referring to an effective presence at all times:
“They set the tents, he says, they provide free meals, medicines for patients
etc....” What does this mean? Simply that the state is absent, sadly, replaced
by a party that wants to be seen as interested in the needs of the people. Membership
will come later, when those satisfied persons want to thank the Brotherhood for
its generosity for giving them the most basic needs.
Whilst
President Obama can deliver rhetoric about the billions needed to revive a
sluggish Arabic economy, everyone knows that he is struggling to find the
bottom of the abyss that is the US fiscal deficit. As such, this particular
foreign policy conundrum will require his full arsenal persuasive powers to
draw upon Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to provide the necessary
stimulus – whether sufficient funds can be raised to effectively stimulate the
Egyptian economy remains to be seen. However, this remains a vital step in
legitimising whatever regime emerges following the interim administration as
well as minimising groundswell support for ideologically and politically
motivated groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Egypt,
and the Arab world with it, find themself at a crucial cross-roads where
eventually a multitude of possibilities will have to collapse to form a single
reality – and in a similar vein to a famously falsely attributed to André
Malraux - "the twenty-first century will be religious or it will not be at
all" as will Egypt and the Arab world have to decide to select national
consciousness over sectarianism.
In
a similar vein, the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras commented (correctly in my
eyes) that "nothing is born or perishes, but things already existing
combine and then separate again." Translated into political-speak:
everything is cyclical – structures and paradigms are established, decline and
collapse only to be replaced with new ones. In the here and now, this means
that the Arab world is beginning to dismantle the political, and potentially
territorial, scaffolding created after the First World War. If this is the
case, the ramifications for the region and the World generally will be immense.
This commentary was published on TheSop.org in USA, in Arabs Today
in UK and on Middle East Spectator blob www.mespectator.blogspot.com on
06/06/2011
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